
































































2 “Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Soviet Union, and Iran,” Department of State Bulletin, 

































3 Stephen L. McFarland, “The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the onset of the Cold War,” Melvyn P. Leffler and 
David S. Painter ed., Origins of the Cold War an International History （Routledge, 1994）, pp.249.
4 The Department of State, BULLETIN, Vol. XIV, No. 349, March 10, 1946. p.358. 原文は、“We have approved 
many adjustments in her favor and, in the process, resolved many serious doubts in her favor.…Great Power 
as well as small powers have agreed under the United Nations Charter not to use force or threat of force 
expect in defense of law and the purposes and principles of the Charter. We will not and we cannot stand aloof 
if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purpose and principle of the Charter.”



























6 FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII （1969）, pp.346-348. Editorial Note.
7 FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII （1969）, p.348.　原文は、“The Govt of the US has the honor to inform the Govt of the 
Soviet Union that it is receiving reports to the effect that there are considerable movements of Soviet combat 
forces and materials of war from the direction of the Soviet frontier towards Tabriz and outward from Tabriz 
in the direction of Tehran, Mahabad and various points in Northwestern Iran. The Govt of the US desires to 
learn whether the Soviet Govt, instead of withdrawing Soviet troops from Iran as urged in the Embassy’s note 
of Mar 6, is bringing additional forces into Iran. In case Soviet forces in Iran are being increased, this Govt 
would welcome information at once regarding the purposes therefor.”
8 Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy Since 1938 Eighth 































9 James Francis Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, （Harper, 1947）, p.255. 
10 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries （1951）, pp.134-135.
11 FRUS, 1946, vol. VI, p.695. 脚注. 原文は、“Stalin’s speech of February 9 constitutes the most important and 
authoritative guide to post-war Soviet policy.... It should be given great weight in any plans which may be 
under consideration for extending credits or other forms of economic assistance to the Soviet Union.” 
（761.00/2— 1146）
12 FRUS, 1946, vol. VI, p.695. 脚注. 原文は、“It is felt that in view of the clear indication of the new Soviet line 
we should be most diligent to counteract Soviet propaganda and political moves which in all probability will be 
directed primarily at dividing the British and ourselves in order to give the Soviets a freer hand to attain their 



























13 FRUS, 1946, vol. VI, pp.694-696.　原文は、“1. Straight Marxist interpretation of World Wars one and two as 
products of crises inherent in monopoly capitalism. This was coupled, however, with statement that World War 
two bore anti-Fascist liberating character from very outset—an interesting deviation from recently revived 
1939-41 line that war was purely “imperialist” in pre-Soviet phase.  2. Contention that war proved Soviet 
system to be “better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system”.  3. Justification in light 
of war of previous 5-year plans and collectivization. Here he admitted significantly that at time of first 5-year 
plan party had not feared “to go against current”.  4. Revelation that ration system will be abolished in near 
future and that “special attention” will be devoted to increasing consumers goods output and lowering prices. 
Here he significantly omitted reference to grave housing situation and measures to improve it.  5. Statement 
that three or more new 5-year plans will be required to guarantee country against “all contingencies” by 













2月22日、ケナンは、さらに、1）「戦後ソ連の展望の基本的性格（Basic features of 
post-war Soviet outlook）」、2）「この見通しの根拠・背景（Background of this outlook）」、
3）「社会レベルの実施政策の予測（Its projection in practical policy on social level）」、4）
「非公然活動レベルの予測（Its projection on unofficial level）」、5）「米国の政策の立場















14 FRUS, 1946, vol. VI, p.696. 原 文 は、“All argue that war proved far-seeing wisdom of party’s pre-war 
policies, expatiate on superior democracy of Soviet system and its freedom from capitalist crises and 
unemployment, and advance present party program of “consolidating victory” through restoration and increase 
of economic might of USSR. Necessity of maintaining and improving Armed Forces unanimously emphasized 
on ground that forces of “Fascism and reaction” are still alive in world, in “bourgeois democracies” and 
elsewhere.













































































































































16 SM-5062-46 to SWNCC, 21 Feb. 46 （derived from JCS 1592/2）; CCS 092 United States （12-21-45）; FRUS, 
1946, vol. I, pp.1165-1166.

























18 原 文 は、From a military point of view, the consolidation and development of the power of Russia is the 
greatest threat to the United States in the foreseeable future, While clashes of vital interest are unlikely to 
occur immediately, the expansion of Russia in the Far East may ultimately bring about serious conflict with the 
United States policies directly, and its expansion to the west and south may involve clashes with Great Britain 
into which we might well be drawn. The “adoption of a firm and friendly attitude in our dealing with the 
Soviet Government” is strongly indorsed with, however, the emphasis upon “firmness”. Collaboration with the 
Soviet Union should stop short not only of compromise of principle but also of expansion of Russian influence in 
Europe and in the Far East. Support of nations threatened by such expansion should be extended, not only 
through the United Nations but through direct economic means if necessary. （Military support at present 
would be difficult if not impracticable.）
19 原文は、Reliance can not be placed upon the efficacy of the United Nations Organization to prevent all war. 
Many incipient disputes can no doubt be quenched, but power is lacking for, and procedure precludes, the 
arbitrary settlement of a major conflict of policy among major nations. In such case war may follow. So long as 
the United Nations Organization functions under its present charter, the security of the United States will by 
necessity require safeguards beyond those of that Organization.
20 原 文 は、Appreciating this fact, one of the fundamentals of national power and prestige must be borne in 
mind, namely the ability to back with force the policies and commitments undertaken by our government. Two 
world wars in which we have fought have brought about our participation in the conflict at a time when we 
were militarily incapable for many months thereafter of keeping pace with our political action, though a 
fortunate geographical position and the fact of our allies holding the enemy at bay have given us the time in 
























21 原文は、In the future neither geography nor allies will render a nation immune from sudden and paralyzing 
attack should an aggressor arise to plague the peace of the world. Because of this, determination of United 
States foreign policy should continually give consideration to our immediate capabilities for supporting our 
policy by arms if the occasion should demand, rather than to our long term potential, which, owing to the 
length of time required for mobilization of the nation’s resources, might not be sufficient to avert disaster in 
another war. In the final analysis the greatest single military factor in the security of the world is the absolute 
military security of the United States.
22 SM-5244-46 to SWNCC, March 13, 1946, FRUS, 1946. vol. I, p.1167, 脚注。原文は、provide them with a political 
estimate of Russia and, so far as possible, an outline of future United States policy with reference to Russia, and 
any requirement for its implementation on the part of the armed forces.
23 Memo, Acting Department of State Member （Matthews） to SWNCC, April 1, 1946, FRUS, 1946. vol. I, 
pp.1167-1171. 原 文 は、As long as present Soviet policies and attitude in regard to other countries continue 
unchanged, the U.S. must accept the fact that it is confronted with the threat of an expanding totalitarian state 
which continues to believe and act on the belief that the world is divided into two irreconcilably hostile camps, 
i.e., Soviet and non-Soviet. As long as Soviet actions continue to support this thesis, the U.S. must accept that 
this policy of expansion by direct and indirect means will be continuous and unlimited.
24 原文は、the U.S. is forced to regard its relations with the Soviet Union in a special category.
25 原文は、the U.S. at the present time must demonstrate to the Soviet Government in the first instance by 
diplomatic means and in the last analysis by military force if necessary that the present course of its foreign 

























26 原文は、The Charter of the United Nations affords the best and most unassailable means through which the U.S. 
can implement its opposition to Soviet physical expansion.
27 原文は、The U.S. should, therefore, explore its relationship with Great Britain and give all feasible political, 
economic, and if necessary military support within the framework of the United Nations, to the United 
Kingdom and the communications of the British Commonwealth.
28 原文は、It is wise to emphasize therefore the importance of being so prepared militarily and of showing such 
firmness and resolution that the Soviet Union will not, through miscalculation of American intentions and 
potentialities, push to the point that results in war. In support of the American foreign policy it is essential that:
 （1） Steps be taken in the immediate future to reconstitute our military establishment so that it can resist 
Soviet expansion by force of arms in areas of our own choosing should such action prove necessary and 
to protect, during the period of diplomatic action, areas which would be strategically essential in any 
armed conflict with the Soviet Union; and
 （2） To create as soon as possible an informed public opinion concerning the issues involved. 
 Should the foreign policy of the U.S. be successful in checking physical Soviet expansion and in bringing 
about a reorientation of Soviet political thinking involving the acceptance of the thesis that the two systems 
can peacefully coexist, the U.S. could then put into effect, the positive and constructive program of relations 
with the Soviet Union designed to produce maximum cooperation and harmony in international relations.
戦後の安全保障秩序形成をめぐる米政権及び米軍部内の論争とその帰結（4）
─ 171 ─
以上に紹介した内容からもうかがえるように、ケナンの「長文電報」も、JCS文書（JCS 
1592/2）も、4月1日付の国務省文書も、きわめて類似した対ソ認識と対ソ政策を示して
いたのである。いわば、ロシア国家の性格と国際情勢の双方の視点からの分析が、共通
した政策的基本方向を導いたといえる点で注目すべき事実であろう。すなわち、対ソ戦
略の基本方向が、ソ連との軍事的対峙でもなく、かといって、国際主義的な宥和政策で
もない、新たな発想へと転換されることとなったのである。
いわばそれは、ソ連の体制や勢力拡張政策を非難しつつも、政治的・経済的・軍事的
介入を放棄し、米国および西側陣営の体制・秩序を守り、国内世論の健全な形成を図る、
現実主義的な「抑止政策」へと大きく前進し始めたことを示していた。そして、さらに
イラン問題をめぐり米国が示した毅然たる姿勢がソ連の抑制をもたらした一連の流れが
奇しくも、その有効性を印象付けたことも事実である。 （以下、続稿）
（追記）　本稿は、平成27年度学習院女子大学特別研究費による研究成果の一部である。
 （本学教授）

